By Cliff Holland and Charles Ross
Spill Management Inc.,
Stoney Creek, ON
The fire began on July 9. On July 11, the City of Hamilton, Ontario declared a state of emergency as it organized a one day evacuation that affected approximately 650 people. It is ironic that Hamilton's last state of emergency also concerned this same property which had been occupied for decades by Usarco, a metal recycling firm which closed in 1990. In 1993, children broke into the closed plant and made off with a quantity of mercury.
Plastimet, which rents the site, began using the 7,400-square-metre building last year for storing, and then recycling, off-specification auto parts such as dashboards. Plastimet did not need an MOEE certificate of approval for the plastics recycling operation.
Although the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Public Health Department is stressing that there should be no long-term health effects from the Plastimet fire, there are many fire-fighters, police officers and residents who have reported a variety of ailments linked to exposure to the smoke.
In many cases, high-risk areas are obvious to knowledgeable and experienced personnel but often are dealt with slowly due to bureaucratic red tape. For instance, the Hamilton Fire Department and the owner of Plastimet were working to resolve outstanding fire code issues, including the lack of a sprinkler system. Without early fire suppression, the cause of the fire may never be revealed, due to the intense heat and the heavy equipment used to move burning materials to aid fire-fighting.
Even though the plastics on the site are not considered to be a hazardous material by themselves, the byproducts from chemical reactions and fires may automatically change the status of a fire (the event) to a hazardous material incident.
While all of the chemicals produced by this fire may never be known, the list includes: dioxins, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, vinyl chlorine, benzene, hydrogen chloride and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). Hydrogen chloride is transformed immediately into hydrochloric acid when it combines with water moisture (i.e, air, fire-fighting water, moisture on the skin and in the lungs).
In terms of health effects, there were immediate signs to warn emergency personnel and residents of the toxic dangers. The smoke smelled of burning plastics, according to eye witnesses. The black smoke of unburnt hydrocarbons (soot) is an indicator of potential carcinogenic and toxic conditions. The verification of polyvinylchloride and polyurethane burning was another warning for toxic conditions.
The colour of the smoke, the size of the column and the knowledge that this was a plastic recycling operation should have been major factors in the "size-up" of the risks and hazards of this hazardous materials incident. The Hamilton area was under a thermal inversion which held the toxic cloud over the site for some time. Due to varying weather conditions, it would be difficult for emergency responders to position themselves safely.
In the early stages of this emergency, air monitoring may only have provided indicator information as to the potential health risks. As part of the initial response, human senses (i.e, smell, sight, taste, irritation), combined with common sense could be just as valid for decision making.
If responders wanted to err on the high side of caution, there was enough justification to advise residents to evacuate the area that evening. Residents were advised to stay in their homes and keep their windows shut. News reports the next day stated that "emergency workers said that there was no health risk." Considering the situation, the Hamilton fire-fighters, with the help of heavy equipment from Stelco's Hilton Works, did an excellent job in suppressing the fire. Within days of the fire, however, fire-fighters were reported to be complaining about minor ear, nose and throat irritations, fatigue, headaches, respiratory problems, vomiting and nausea. There were also complaints about burning sensations in their ankles and feet.
Inhalation and ingestion problems exist only because response personnel did not choose to use both primary (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) and secondary respiratory protection (cartridge respirators).
Fire-fighters were well protected when they wore their specialized bunker gear and supplied air. However, news photos and reports have confirmed that there were periods when response personnel working in toxic conditions were not protecting the entry routes to the body at all times. The atmosphere included hydrochloric acid vapours strong enough to corrode fire equipment and burn skin and lungs.
It is difficult to convince those who do not work with chemicals on a regular basis to maintain appropriate levels of personal protection at all times. People who are trained in handling small chemical spills and even fires involving hazardous materials may not understand the seriousness of toxicity until it becomes an issue in a fire of this magnitude. The dose/response relationship between the amount of chemical and the exposure time is often overlooked in minor incidents.
To err on the high side of caution, responders should consider changing supplied air cylinders, hooking onto purified-air supply lines or donning cartridge respirators to maintain respiratory protection.
A total of about 200 fire-fighters and 100 police officers rotated duties throughout the emergency. All were asked to fill out Workers Compensation Board forms to establish their history in the event of future health problems. According to public statements, police officers were not issued respiratory protection until the city declared the state of emergency and residents were advised to evacuate.
Public information and warning systems for residents living in the area of the fire scene will be ongoing issues. Many have complained of nausea, sore throats and stomach upsets. They have also complained about information on the health risks that appeared contradictory and confusing concerning issues such as their exposure to dioxin.
The health department has announced that it will monitor the health status of people who live near the fire. The health department is very likely correct in its statement that long-term (chronic) health effects "are not expected to result from the brief time that residents were exposed to the chemicals in the smoke and soot from the fire."
People likely have a far greater health risk from being exposed to the emissions and contaminants from major industries over a long period of time than from the short-term exposures during the Plastimet fire.
The health department has also said that Hamilton's water supply has not been affected by the run-off of fire-fighting water contaminated with heavy metals and unburnt hydrocarbons. According to the health department, levels of toxic materials in the storm sewer outflow to Hamilton Harbour were low. Hamilton's drinking water is taken from Lake Ontario.
As of press time, there was pressure for a public inquiry from local politicians, MPPs, residents of the area and environmental organizations such as Greenpeace. An inquiry would focus on long-term health impacts. It would deal with recycling operations and enforcement of the National Fire Code. Other issues will include responsibilities for the costs of fire-fighting and who is paying for the site cleanup. Also likely to be scrutinized will be the role of the Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy in providing mobile air monitoring services.
However, inquiries should also examine:
The lesson to be learned from this tragic fire is: "Be Prepared".
This article has been abridged